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Summary
The terrorist attacks of September 11 resulted in the largest insured catastrophic
loss in history, estimated to total as much as $70 billion.  Even though the insurance
industry committed to pay losses resulting from the attacks, industry spokesmen asserted
that in view of the impending difficulty in obtaining reinsurance for the risk of future
terrorist attacks, primary insurers would not be able to cover future terrorism losses
without a federal backstop. 
On November 29, 2001, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 3210, the
Terrorism Risk Protection Act, providing for a temporary federal backstop.  In the
Senate, four similar measures were introduced in 2001(S. 1743, S. 1744, S. 1748, and
S. 1751), but no action was taken during the first session of the 107th Congress.  Senate
Majority Leader Tom Daschle indicated that backstop legislation would be considered
again in 2002, but efforts to reach a unanimous consent (UC) agreement to bring H.R.
3210 to the floor of the Senate and amend it by substituting the language of a
compromise proposal, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, were not successful.  On June
7, 2002, Senators Dodd, Sarbanes, Schumer, and Reid introduced the compromise
proposal as a separate bill (S. 2600).  
This report discusses and compares H.R. 3210 and S. 2600, and will be updated as
events warrant. 
Background
The terrorist attacks of September 11 resulted in the largest insured catastrophic loss
in history, estimated to total as much as $70 billion.  At the time, the insurance industry
committed to pay losses resulting from the attacks and not invoke “act of war” clauses,
despite considerable discussion that such an invocation might be appropriate.  Despite the
magnitude of the projected losses, the solvency of the insurance industry and most
insurance firms has not apparently been threatened, in part because of the spreading of
losses among many secondary insurers through the industry practice of “reinsurance.”  
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In light of the huge “9/11” losses and because of the lack of any actuarial basis for
determining loss exposures, however, many reinsurers have indicated an unwillingness
to accept the risk of loss from terrorism in the future.  In turn, industry spokesmen have
asserted that in view of the impending difficulty in obtaining reinsurance for the risk of
future terrorist attacks, primary insurers would not be able to cover future terrorism losses
without some form of federal backstop.  There have been anecdotal accounts of
dramatically increased premiums or outright inability of some businesses and major real
estate landmarks to get insurance that includes coverage for acts of terrorism.  Several
proposals for a federal backstop were introduced in Congress in 2001, and one – H.R.
3210 – passed the House on November 29, 2001.  On April 24, 2002, a unanimous
consent (UC) agreement was proposed to bring H.R. 3210 to the Senate floor and amend
it by substituting the language of the compromise agreed to by Banking Committee
members, Senators Dodd, Sarbanes, and Gramm.  Efforts to reach a UC were not
successful, and on June 7, 2002, Senators Dodd, Sarbanes, Schumer and Reid introduced
the compromise proposal as a separate bill (S. 2600).  
 Advocates of backstop proposals say that the program is needed because the lack
of such terrorism coverage in the short term could in turn impede the ability of financial
services providers to finance commercial property acquisitions and new construction
projects.  On May 23, 2002, the Joint Economic Committee issued a report (available at
[http://www.house.gov/jec]),which found that the market for terrorism insurance remains
limited, and that the problems associated with terrorism insurance pose a significant threat
to sustained economic growth.  A discussion of the state of the market for terrorism
insurance can also be found in CRS Report RS21106, Terrorism Insurance - The 2002
Marketplace.  
Comparison of H.R. 3210 and the S. 2600
S. 2600 is similar to the House-passed legislation in several aspects, such as
establishing a temporary program, providing for oversight by the U.S. Treasury, setting
triggers (losses sufficient to bring the federal backstop into play), setting definitions of
what constitutes a terrorism event, and preempting state laws.  The two bills differ with
respect to whether or not assistance must be repaid, the nature of legal modifications and
limitations, and other specific details. 
Key provisions, similarities, and differences are set out in the following chart.
Provision H.R. 3210 S. 2600 
Name Terrorism Risk Protection
Act
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act





Governance Oversight by Secretary of
Treasury –  may issue
regulations




Provision H.R. 3210 S. 2600 
Length of
Program
One year, but may be
extended two additional years
One year, but may be extended
for one additional year
Trigger 
(Industry-wide)
Losses exceed $1 billion Losses exceed $5 million, then
two levels of shared losses: up
to $10 billion, and over $10
billion (increases to $15






$100 million and individual
insurer’s losses exceed 10%
of capital surplus and 10% of
net premiums
Trigger is a retention amount
referred to as “deductible” at
first level based on insurer’s
market share times $10 billion




90% loan, but if trigger is
industry-wide, then subject to
a $5 million deductible per
insurer
80% cost sharing for amounts
over individual insurers’
market share “deductible” (net
of reinsurance) up to $10




$100 billion $100 billion per year (applies
to industry liability also,
capping industry share at $19
billion)





No, but appears as though
insurer not writing terrorism
policies still subject to
assessments
Yes, participating insurers
must offer terrorism insurance
in all commercial policies
(assumes opt-out by
policyholder)
Pay-back Yes, through assessments on
insurers for first $20 billion,
and surcharges on
policyholders for amounts
from $20-$100 billion, with






Yes. If Secretary of Treasury,
in consultation with NAIC, so
determines
Yes. Secretary of Treasury, in
consultation with NAIC may
establish procedures for
municipalities and other
entities in existence on 9/11
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Provision H.R. 3210 S. 2600 
Definition of
Terrorism
Yes. To be developed by
Secretary of Treasury and
NAIC consistent with the
requirements of the Act
Yes. As certified by Secretary
of Treasury, in concurrence
with Secretary of State and
Attorney General – based on





Yes. Sense of Congress that
states require separate
disclosure of cost of terrorism
coverage










Yes.  As to life insurance










Federal cause of action in
district court(s) designated by
Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation
General Federal cause of
action (no designation by







proportional as to fault. U.S.
right of subrogation.  20%
cap on attorneys’ fees
Punitive damages do not
constitute “insured losses” and
thus no federal participation.  
U.S. right of subrogation
Studies Life insurance, railroad and
trucking insurance, and
reinsurance pool system for
future acts of terrorism




None required, except for
data not available to NAIC
Only as to claims (premium
rates reported to NAIC)
State Preemption Yes. Of impediments to
increasing premiums to
recover assessments, but not
as to filings or subsequent
review of rates
Yes. As to “terrorism”
definition and state prior
approval rating statutes.




Provision H.R. 3210 S. 2600 
Civil Monetary
Penalties
Yes. $1 million against
insurers for failing to pay
assessments or surcharges,
erroneous data, or violation
of regulations
Yes. To be assessed by
Secretary of Treasury for
violations of Act or of any
rule, regulation or order
Report to
Congress
Yes. If Secretary extends the
term of the program, must
state reasons
Yes. Not later than nine
months after the date of
enactment, covering required
items, plus joint report 12
months later with Comptroller
General as to NAIC, FTC, and
GAO reports
    .
